Monday, December 16, 2013

'Tis the Season(ality)

As we embark upon the holiday season, I wanted to take a moment to update a data set which relates to the seasonal performance of the S&P 500 industry groups.  The history runs monthly from January 1990 through November 2013 - nearly 24 years and 23 industry groupings.  

While using seasonal tendencies alone is not a robust investment strategy, it does add an interesting aspect to to the discussion.  I believe such analysis has the most relevancy when combined with relative valuation work (i.e. an industry group entering a seasonally strong/weak period is more likely to show its tendency if also supported by relative under/over valuation measures).

I also believe that many analysts make an easy mistake when discussing seasonality by choosing to comment on average relative performance.  The danger of using an average is that one or two very strong, or very weak observations can skew the general tendency.  For example, although the average relative performance in April of the Autos & Components sector is 4.91% better than that of the index (one of the strongest monthly outcomes), it has only outperformed in 13 of the 24 Aprils - just one observation away from a coin toss.

Therefore, to help overcome the tendency of averages to skew results, I prefer to rely on median performances and the absolute number of periods in which a sector has done better than the market.  Below I display the monthly median relative performance (blue) followed by the number of months in which the Auto & Components sector outperformed (yellow) the S&P 500.  There is very little seasonal tendency in this sector, save some weakness in May.















After examining 276 industry months (23 industries across 12 months), only 14 industries show performance consistency of 75% or greater in a given month.  In five of these instances we find industries which have outperformed, and another nine which have underperformed similarly.
















The most seasonal sector would appear to be Capital Goods which appears three times (consistently strong in November and December and consistently weak in October).  The strongest seasonals though, would appear to be Software & Services in June (outperform 75% of the time, by a median of 2.19%) and Transportation in October (75% and 2.34%).  The weakest seasonal would be Food & Staples Retailers which tend to underperform in April 75% of the time by a median of 2.17%.

Seasonality is just a beginning and not an investment strategy in and of itself.  For those who would like to see the complete data file and graph set to combine with their own valuation work, please drop me an email and I will be happy to provide the full results.

Best Wishes to all for a Very Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.






Sunday, November 17, 2013

Winners and Losers

Consumers have not made the necessary adjustments to again become the motor of economic growth in the United States.  While progress in debt reduction has been seen in certain areas, well-intentioned, but mis-guided policies have created problems in others. Overall, the consumer is only marginally stronger than they were in the midst of the crisis.

Jobs and Income growth will be key to any consumer revival, but to date have been substandard, while the will to work seems to have eroded.  Without stronger jobs and income growth, we can not have consumption growth. Unfortunately, incomes have been in a secular decline for more than a half-century, though the accumulation of debt during this period has hidden the direct link between incomes and consumption. The days of debt-driven consumption are over and greater leverage and an easy monetary policy are not a salvation for Main Street.

In addition to the poor numbers, the quality of jobs added in this expansion has been substandard, and heavily reliant on part-timers.  This too, has depressed incomes.  It would seem regulation had a hand in this as well as in the difficulty that start-ups, the usual driver of jobs, are having.

There have been winners - namely those with the where-with-all to take advantage of the Federal Reserve's Quantitative Easing (QE) policies - borrowers, stock market investors and banks head the list.  US non-financial corporations have responded naturally to the incentives put before them, but could be in danger should they not be careful as the quality of debt seems to be in decline as its quantity increases.

The topics I will touch upon this month - debt, income, jobs and consumption are all complex and inter-related.  Any one of them could be its own post; the four together could easily become a 100+ page white paper.  However, not wishing to subject anyone to that kind of mess, especially before the holidays, I will be a bit more brief on detail than usual - though I will link to the larger studies should one wish to jump in with both feet.



Where to Begin - The Consumer

In most countries, the consumer is the largest single economic entity in the economy with spending accounting for somewhere between 50% and 70% of annual GDP.  Canada and the US are at the upper end of that range, while China is an outlier at the bottom end.  Thus any discussion around the prospects for economic growth must start with, and focus on, households, their behavior and their potential.

Consumption as Percent of GDP
Canada                70.2%
United States       68.6%
Hong Kong           65.0%
Japan                  60.9%
India                   56.8%
Euro Area            56.3%
Australia             53.9%
China                  36.6%
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Statistics Canada, Asia Development Bank, Eurostat  

The US Government's policy response (and that of many other developed countries) has been to attempt to re-kindle the moribund shopper, so far to little avail.  Policies from "Cash for Clunkers", to HARP to an unprecedented entry by the Federal Reserve into the market for Treasury and Mortgage securities have attempted this, albeit through various channels. However, for those who took more than one or two introductory Economics classes, the weaker than normal economic response should not have caught them by surprise, yet that is what it seems to have done to policy makers - even as a handful of market commentators shouted caution.
  • "when an economy is excessively over-indebted and dis-inflationary factors force central banks to cut overnight interest rates to as close to zero as possible, central bank policy is powerless to further move inflation or growth metrics. The periods between 1927 and 1939 in the U.S. (and elsewhere), and from 1989 to the present in Japan, are clear examples of the impotence of central bank policy actions during periods of over-indebtedness" - Lacy H. Hunt, Ph.D. (http://www.caseyresearch.com/articles/federal-reserve-policy-failures-are-mounting) 

Let's start my analysis with a simple law of gravity - and it's not "what goes up must come down". Rather, it is an economic law of gravity, namely that "one can only spend over time what they earn over time". Empirically, this is demonstrated in the chart and table below.


















Compound Annual Growth Rates over Various Time Periods to Dec 2012
                                 
                                         5 Years     10 Years     20 Years     30 Years     40 Years     50 Years
Personal Income               2.8%           4.2%          4.8%            5.5%            6.7%          7.0%
Pers Consumption Exp      2.7%           4.2%          5.0%            4.7%            6.9%          7.1%


Side Notes: 

  • income growth has been in secular decline for much of the past half-century
  • over longer periods, income and consumption growth are strongly linked

While over longer periods, spending and income are clearly linked, they can diverge over shorter time frames. Comparing nominal levels of spending to income as I do in the following chart, one can see how spending began to grow relatively faster than incomes from the mid 1970's until its reversal over the years 2005 - 2007.


















These short-term divergences, where one can spend more than they earn, are related to borrowing behavior. Unsurprisingly, the period from 1975 described above, coincided with a build-up in household debt, while the period since 2007 has coincided with a partial rebuilding of consumer balance sheets.  This kind of borrowing activity accelerated spending beyond income growth for a period of time, but as borrowed amounts must be repaid at some point in the future (and out of income), it had the effect of stemming current growth -- and this is where policy makers have gotten it wrong by trying to recreate the same dynamic, but from a much more difficult, and unsustainable, starting point.

















Economic and Fiscal policies that attempt to rekindle spending by encouraging an increase in an already large debt pile, were doomed to fail.  Consumer debt had risen to record highs in both nominal and relative (to income) terms, fueled mainly by the residential mortgage market.  A necessary part of any re-balancing requires consumers to first reduce debt and strengthen their personal balance sheets before they can safely come back to the shopping aisle.  Policy makers did not act as if they understood this.  The debt adjustment continues as it must, but is being hampered by Government policies which encourage debt accumulation.

Below, we can see that credit card debt (most of the revolving credit) has indeed corrected (down nearly $200 Billion from its December 2008 peak), as has mortgage debt (down $1.3 Trillion from its January 2008 peak).  Unfortunately, this has been partially offset by booms in student loan debt (up more than $550 Billion since December 2008) and auto loan borrowings (up $127 Billion since December 2010).  In short, total consumer credit has only partially adjusted, now resting near 2003 (relative to income) or 2005 (in absolute) levels.












The best way to speed the adjustment would have been to focus on policies that could accelerate repayment - and the best way to do that would have been to spur jobs and income growth.  While much lip service has been paid to these goals, the record is, unfortunately, dismal. 

 Let's look at a few facts relating to job creation over the past few years:
  • The percentage of the US population that works has fallen dramatically.  A record 91.5 million Americans are now "not in the labor force" - Bureau of Labor Statistics
  • Of those "not in the labor force", a record number indicate that they have no interest in finding a job, even if one were offered - As a share of all those “not in the labor force,” the number of people who want a job has been generally declining since the early 1980's. Three decades ago, more than 10% wanted a job; more recently, that number dipped below 6% Regis Barnichon and Andrew Figura, 
    Declining Labor Force Attachment and 
    Downward Trends in Unemployment 
    and Participation"  
    http://research.barcelonagse.eu/tmp/working_papers/728.pdf



  • The labor force participation rate is at an 25 year low - Bureau of Labor Statistics.  



  • For younger people, this rate is at a 40-year low as the employment rate of persons aged 21 to 25 has fallen from 84% to 72% since 2000 - Georgetown University Center on Education, "Failure to Launch" http://cew.georgetown.edu/failuretolaunch/
  • Of the jobs created since "recovery" began, a large number have been part time in nature.  The increase this time around though, was much larger than seen in previous recovery periods and remains above previous highs many months later - Bureau of Labor Statistics



  • Young workers are now 30 years old when they first earn a median-wage income, up from 26 years old in 1980 - Georgetown University Center on Education, "Failure to Launch"

    • the average number of jobs created by start ups has fallen from the historical average of 7 to less than 5 today
    • over the period 2009-11 the Obama administration issued 106 new regulations each expected to have an economic impact of at least $100 million a year
    • In 2011—the last year for which Commerce Department data is available, 35% of firms operating in the U.S. were five years old or less. That compares with 40% in 2007.
    • The Labor Department's establishment birthrate/deathrate, a proxy for the pace of new-business formations and failures, shows that for the first time (other than a brief moment in 2001), more companies folded, than have been formed.


It would seem clear that US Households, as a group, are not having a good go of it, and, until debt is reduced further, will continue to sputter.  So if US Households are not making much progress, has the massive amount of money and time invested by our leaders benefited anyone?  

The Winners 

Corporations, who's investment comprises about 16% of annual GDP, have seen profits climb to 80+ year highs as a percentage of National Income.


















They have also rationally responded to the ultra-low interest rates and increased their borrowing.  After dipping briefly during the crisis, business debt levels have jumped to record highs since the Fed's QE policy was put in place.   



















More recently, however, a larger amount of that borrowing has been done at a lower-quality standard and will need to be watched.
  • Many companies have been able to increase their borrowing from exuberant markets.  More than $225 billion of "covenant-lite" loans, or loans that come with fewer protections for lenders, have been sold so far this year, according to S&P Capital IQ. That figure eclipses the $100 billion issued in 2007 and means a majority of new leveraged loans, 55%, are “cov-lite” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f151df3a-3a6f-11e3-9243-00144feab7de.html#axzz2kjbS3Zqz

Most importantly, however, little of the record borrowing has flowed into new investment (and thereby GDP).   On a nominal basis, corporate investment has only recently recovered to previous peaks and as a percent of GDP remains near historical lows - even though overall debt levels are at a record.






























Instead, much of the borrowing has been used to financially craft earnings growth via buybacks and suppressed interest expenses (see my previous post, "The Profitability Illusion") - and while this may have been great for shareholders, it has not been a positive for the economy.



http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21587213-new-book-explains-why-business-investment-has-been-low-profits-prophet

In fact, companies which heavily repurchase their own shares have seen their stock prices outperform the overall market over both short and long time frames, according to  Andrew Wilkinson, the Chief Economic strategist at Miller Tabak & Co. The S&P 500 Buyback Index, which measures the 100 stocks with the highest buyback ratios, has surged 40% this year, compared with a 24% rally for the S&P 500

The Government is the third player in the market and has stepped up in a big way, both in its fiscal and monetary policy response.  Trillion dollar deficits were incurred.  Yet, because this borrowing has not visibly flowed into the real economy, consumers have not been able to take advantage to sufficiently clean up their balance sheets. Instead, the financial markets have benefited, as has a small group of favored industries -- notably automobiles and banking.  Some other favored players (clean energy, etc) have received subsidies or grants, but also failed to produce jobs.

Many policies, about which I won't debate the merits or intentions, have also failed to stimulate activity on Main Street.  Lets take a look at some of the unintended consequences of these actions.

The Federal Reserves QE program, which today purchases $85 billion in fixed income securities each month creates reserves which banks have left on deposit with the Fed.  The Wall Street Journal notes that of the $2.365 trillion in reserves at the Fed, only $59 billion are required to be held there.  The remainder of roughly $2.3 trillion, called "excess reserves" receive a payment of 25 basis points annually.  While this may not seem like much, it represents a transfer from the Fed to Banks of $5.75 billion each year.  Since the Fed is required to remit profits to the US Treasury every year, this reduction in Treasury profits could be construed as a "back-door" transfer from tax payers to the nation's banks. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304069604579153290395722608?mod=WSJ_Opinion_MIDDLETopOpinion



In addition, one could say that borrowers were also net winners as they have been able to issue debt at below unfettered rates, while savers have foregone interest income.  A McKinsey Global Institutes study attempted to quantify this effect and found that Government borrowers were the biggest winners, with the US, UK and Euro Zone governments saving $1.6 trillion due to below normal interest rates.  Non-financial companies also fared well, saving $710 billion in debt service payments.  The big losers were were households who forgave $630 billion in net interest income in the United States, the euro zone and Britain, as interest rates for savers plunged.  




(http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/Economic_Studies/QE_and_ultra_low_interest_rates_Distributional_effects_and_risks)

Another winner of recent policies have been those most involved in the stock market.  As Bianco Research shows quite clearly in the chart below, when QE policies were in place, the stock market tended to do well. On days when we were in between QE events, the markets declined.  This is a very large sample size and the results seem to speak for themselves - if you had money to invest in the stock market, you did well.  If you didn't and were dependent upon wage or interest income, you struggled.  Or as Michael Cembalest, Chairman of Market and Investment Strategy for J.P. Morgan Asset Management noted, all of the gains in the S&P 500 since January 2009 have come in weeks during which the Fed actively bought securities.  In the weeks during which the Fed did not act, the markets declined. 
(http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2013/10/17/dont-fight-the-fed-because-100-of-stock-market-gains-since-2009-occurred-in-the-weeks-the-fed-was-buying-bonds/)



Life was even better for those who used leverage, and another area where certain consumers chose to incur debt was in the stock market.  Margin debt today sits near record levels (shown below as a percent of total market capitalization) - and we must ask, are we just trading off near-term risk reduction at the expense of building problems down the road?  Matt King, a credit strategist at Citigroup commented that "it strikes me that one of the things we're doing is suppressing at-the-money risk and then adding to tail risks". (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b92f9434-4c9a-11e3-804b-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2kjdGLojE).  In plain english, Mr. King is saying that current actions seem to be trying to support markets today, while building up future risks should something go wrong.  I fully agree.





















The belief that QE policies will continue has driven a wall of cash, more than $275 billion through late October, into US listed mutual funds and ETF's accroding to TrimTabs Investment Research.  That's the most for one year since 2000's $324 billion - which is, of course, the year the tech bubble burst.  About 1/6 of this year's total came in October alone.  TrimTabs notes that the net total of $45.5 billion through October 25th is the fifth highest monthly inflow on record (the two biggest months were January ($66.3 billion) and July ($55.3 billion).  (http://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2013/10/29/277-billion-into-stock-funds-so-far-this-year-highest-since-2000/?link=sfmw).

In this post, I have attempted to show that the real economy - defined as consumer spending and corporate investment has struggled.  In addition, and despite great efforts to heal the economy, the consumer is still not in a position to act as a sustainable source of economic growth.  Corporations, who have visibly benefited from current policies have, however, not contributed to economic growth (via hiring or investment) as they normally do, but instead have rationally used the artificial conditions put in place by the Fed to increase leverage, buy back shares, craft earnings and boost share prices.  In addition, the quality of more recent borrowings has become questionable and could be a problem in the making.  The winners have been the financial markets and those who are able to participate in them as well as the banks and governments.

To close, I would suggest you read in its entirety, the following Wall Street Journal Op Ed, that was recently penned by Andrew Huszar, a senior fellow at Rutgers Business School, and a former Morgan Stanley managing director. In 2009-10, Mr. Huszar was asked to manage the Federal Reserve's $1.25 trillion agency mortgage-backed security purchase program.  This Op Ed is Mr. Huszar's apology for the failure of the program he managed. (http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303763804579183680751473884).

Happy Thanksgiving to all your families.










Tuesday, October 1, 2013

Not All Debt is Created Equal

Today is Day 1 of the US Government shutdown.  In spite of the 24/7 media hoopla, this is, in fact, the 16th shutdown of the Federal Government since 1976.  Shutdowns have ranged from 1 to 21 days in duration, with an average of 6.5 and a median of 3 days.

Much has been made of the approach of this event and the supposedly "horrific"implications if we don't borrow more to keep the government open.  Lost in the coverage, however, is the fact that the United States (as well as most other developed countries) have a bigger problem which is no closer to being addressed. It's not a Democratic problem, nor a Republican one.  Not a Labor issue nor a Tory one -- nor a Christian Democrat, nor a Social Democrat, nor a Green Party one.  In fact, it is not a political problem at all.  It is a generational one that will unfortunately be passed along to our children and theirs.  Simply put, governments everywhere have spent AND promised to spend much more than can possibly be generated by their economies without impinging upon growth.  

I have written on this issue at least annually since 2004 and don't wish to rehash the problem in its entirety. However, to quickly review, there are three aspects of any debt situation that one must examine to determine whether a threat exists.  Unfortunately, the most important aspect is the one that is least analyzed.

Certainly, the amount of debt (relative to a country's size) is important.  Below I show the situation of the G-7 countries, plus Spain.  Not one is a shining example of fiscal prudence, though the US is the best of a weak bunch, while Japan and Italy have been most profligate over longer periods of time. 
















Historically, as debt as a percentage of GDP closes in on 90%, it has been observed that a country's subsequent growth slows (the best discussion of this effect is detailed in the book "This Time is Different" by Reinhart and Rogoff.  Subsequent criticism of their findings by a group at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst is oft-quoted to dispute the conclusions of R&R.  However, this criticism tells me more about the critics than R&R - they like to read headlines and executive summaries and not the nitty-gritty.  For those who do read further, it is clear that the R&R conclusions remain valid).

Secondly, how quickly the debt pile growing, the annual fiscal deficit, tells us whether the problem is being addressed or worsening.  Ideally, you  must see the deficit growing more slowly than nominal GDP so that the ratio of debt to GDP can fall.  Here, some countries (Germany, Canada and, oddly, Italy) seem to be making progress, while others appear hopelessly lost (Japan).
















Thirdly, and rarely discussed, is the cost of the debt.  Having lots of debt, but not having to pay any interest on it is an interesting concept.  In fact, this is the state of most countries in the world today.  Historically low borrowing costs have allowed governments (and companies and households) to borrow more and more, without having to pay out greater amounts of their incomes. However, as an economy begins to grow and interest rates rise, debt service costs will likewise rise.  Newly incurred debt (each year's fiscal deficit) as well as previously borrowed amounts that are coming due must all be financed at the new (higher) current rate.  Thus entities with high fiscal deficits and those with shorter maturities are the most vulnerable to having success (a growing economy) short circuit itself.  

Consider for a second the US Government. With a fiscal deficit at over 4% of GDP, a little more than 5% of its total debt pile is priced anew each year (deficit/debt).  In addition, nearly 1/3 of  previously borrowed amounts will mature in the next 18 months, and nearly half in the next three years.  The US is therefore one of the countries most at risk to interest rate movements (along with Canada, Spain and Japan), while only the UK seems to have taken true advantage of the lower interest rate environment, locking in rates for years to come.  

Debt Maturity Profiles for G-7 plus Spain (% of debt maturing within time frame)
             Can            USA           Spain          Japan    Germany      France               Italy             UK
0 - 18 Mos45%32%30%31%25%23%23%11%
18 - 36 Mos17%17%18%14%16%15%14%6%
3 - 5 Yr10%17%16%15%17%14%15%12%
5 - 10 Yr12%22%19%20%26%29%26%23%
+10 Yr16%12%17%20%16%19%22%47%
< 3 Year62%49%48%45%41%38%37%17%


Consider the following two examples.  

The coupon rate on all US government debt that matures in the next 36 months is 1.08%.  If the government wanted to lock in today's low rates for the next ten years, the cost of borrowing would rise to 2.61% on this piece of the debt (the current 10-year yield), while any new debt incurred would also be charged a rate of 2.61%.  Overall annual interest expense would increase by $141 billion under this scenario (assuming interest rates do not rise over this period and deficits run at 4.1% of GDP for the next 3 years).  However, if rates were to normalize (3.92% is the average 10-year bond yield since 2000), interest costs would soar by $243.5 billion.  To put this into perspective, total individual income tax receipts for the US were $1.27 trillion in the 12 months through this August.  Additional debt service costs would equate to 19.2% of individual income taxes currently collected under even a modest increase in interest costs.

The same analysis applied to the United Kingdom reveals a much different outcome.  The coupon rate on all UK government debt that matures in the next 36 months is 3.04%.  If the government wanted to lock in today's low rates for the next ten years, the cost of borrowing would actually FALL to 2.72% on this piece of the debt (the current 10-year yield), while any new debt incurred would also be charged a rate of 2.72%.  Overall annual interest expense would increase by GBP 7.665 billion under this scenario (assuming interest rates do not rise over this period and deficits run at 6.5% of GDP for the next 3 years).  However, if rates were to normalize (4.10% is the average 10-year bond yield since 2000), interest costs would grow by a larger GBP 15.1 billion.  To put this into perspective, total individual income tax receipts for the UK were GBP 194.8 billion in the 12 months through this August.  Additional debt service costs would equate to just 7.75% of individual income and wealth taxes currently collected.

Whilst the study of the size and on-going fiscal situation of countries is important, a potentially even more important aspect - interest rate sensitivity is being ignored.  In a rising rate environment, the United States and a number of other highly levered countries are in danger of suffocating on their own debt, while the UK - a country with a larger debt pile and a bigger fiscal deficit would fare much better.  

So while the US debates the government shut down and the Japanese Abe-nomics and the Germans try to form a new ruling coalition and the Spanish, Greeks, Italians and Portuguese debate austerity versus growth, the bigger picture goes un-addressed to the detriment of future generations nearly everywhere.

Sunday, September 8, 2013

"Lies, Damn Lies and Statistics"

The title to this short posting was popularized by Mark Twain, though it's true origin is open to debate.  Whether Mr. Twain or another is to be credited, I can think of no better description of the monthly government employment numbers which elicit so much attention from investors.

Last Friday, the government report that 169,000 new jobs were created in August, slightly below the expectations of economists and the average figures over the past year.  Markets interpreted such weakness to mean that the Federal Reserve would be unlikely begin its tapering of bond purchases in September as rumored.

Now for the truth.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the economy added 378,000 new jobs in August, but this number was "seasonally adjusted" downward to the reported figure of 169,000.  "Well then, that's good, you say.  The economy is stronger than we thought".  No, not so fast.  Last month when the government reported 104,000 new jobs (seasonally adjusted, of course), the economy really lost 1,186,000.

Confused?  Allow me to clarify.  The reason the government looks to adjust the monthly numbers is precisely so we don't all become schizophrenic as we see jobs swing from one million lost one month, to nearly 400,000 created the next.  Precisely because there is a seasonality to hiring (for example retailers hire many temporary employees in the months before Christmas, only to let them go in January and college students flood the job market early in the summer, but then leave to go back to school in the fall), the government tries to make one month's figures more comparable to previous months by creating the adjustment. And it is this adjusted number to which the world so frenetically reacts.  But the question remains, should we ascribe such certainty to a figure which is really just an (educated) guess?

The size of the monthly adjustments are huge.  In fact, the median monthly adjustment (using data from January 1940 to the present), is more than 75% of the actual figure - and in the last decade, the adjustment has been bigger than the actual number in nearly 50% of the months.

I would also note, since the 1960's, the size of the adjustment (on a percentage basis) has grown as have the number of months where the adjustment is bigger than the actual figure. Usually when you've had practice doing something over and over, you get better.  The government seems to be getting worse.

                                                                                         70's      80's      90's    00's 
Pct of Months Where Adjustment > Actual                         23%       29%      36%      48%
Median Size of Monthly Adjustment Relative to Actual       63%       69%      80%      97%

With such a margin for error, why do investors focus so intently on these monthly numbers?  I argue, that they shouldn't.

If one really wants to understand the state of the labor market, a better way to use these figures is to look at a 12 month moving average of the unadjusted jobs created.  By using a full year, seasonality is fairly scrubbed away and one does not need to rely on the accuracy (or lack thereof) of government adjusters.
















When we do this we find:


  1. job creation remains anemic compared to historical norms (even moreso when thought of relative to the size of the economy and population)
  2. job creation is disappointing given the historic magnitude of the job losses that preceded the recovery
  3. job creation is disappointing given the amount of government spending that was employed to accelerate the recovery
  4. the monthly rate of job creation has not changed in the past two years


So, there really is no reason for the Fed to change their view of the economy as a result of Friday's numbers. The economy remains weak and is getting little better on the jobs front.  Of course, any single monthly number can be used to justify any course the Fed decides to take, but from a fundamental perspective, the jobs picture has simply not changed.

Saturday, August 17, 2013

It's the Great Rotation, Charlie Brown

In the 1966 animated movie, “It’s the Great Pumpkin, Charlie Brown”, Linus van Pelt sits in the pumpkin patch on Halloween evening, waiting for the Great Pumpkin to arrive while his friends trick or treat from door to door gathering candy and popcorn balls.  Unfortunately, for Linus, the Great Pumpkin never shows.

Today, there’s lots of talk about “The Great Rotation” – an idea that as the economy recovers, rates will rise, investors will abandon bonds and equities will soar based on a better economy and better earnings.  Like Linus, investors who believe in this real world coming, will be disappointed.

Over the past year, the S&P 500 is up by more than 20% while earnings per share have climbed only 4.2% (even less excluding financial stocks).  Thus, investors have already been factoring in improvement into their willingness to pay more for each dollar’s worth of today’s earnings.

The flaw in their thinking is twofold:   
  • First, stocks tend to do better when rates are falling, than when they are rising
  • Secondly, there are two “components” to earnings – operating and financing, and rising rates will dramatically challenge the second of these


When we think of how a company works, we assume without much afterthought, that it does better when the economy does better.  However, let’s examine this a little bit more.

A company makes its widgets, or provides a service, which they sell for a certain amount.  However, there was a cost to manufacturing and selling that widget or service – materials, electricity, labor, marketing, etc.  The difference between these costs and the sales price is the operating profit – or what we think of as “the business”.

There is, however, a second, less considered component to earnings, and that is the financial component.  In order to make their widgets, the company had to invest in plant, property and equipment.  Usually, they will have to sell equity or borrow money to fund this investment.  Whether they choose to issue equity or bonds, borrow from the bank, set the term of the borrowing, etc. is a financial decision every bit as important as the decisions made in manufacturing its product.

Over the past few years, many companies reacted to the Fed's decision to artificially lower interest rates (Quantitative Easing) by borrowing to fund their investments.  As evidence of this, we can see how debt outstanding as a percentage of assets has risen since QE was introduced in 2008.


















Even when accounting for the cash that has built up on balance sheets (borrowing for future purposes), leverage has still increased.  This is most clearly see if we subtract cash retained on the balance sheet from the total debt amount (giving us Net Debt) and express that as a percent of assets.  Such an exercise shows a rise in leverage over recent years to 14.2% of assets (from a 15-year average of 11.5% and a 2008, pre-QE low of 7.1%)
















Interestingly, however, the overall cost of this borrowing has not grown, even as the amount borrowed has.  At the end of 2012, interest expense fell to 1.78% of sales from a 15-year average of 3.88% (and note it had never been below even 3% of sales until 2009).
















So let’s say a company sells it widget for $100, and its cost of materials, labor, etc was $90.  Then their operating, or business, margin is 10 cents on the dollar.  Now, let’s subtract the costs of borrowing, currently 1.78 cents.  So the bottom line profits are 8.2 cents for every dollar of goods sold.  If, however, the cost of borrowing were closer to “normal” (3.88% of sales), the bottom line would be more like 6.1 cents.  In other words, you could expect earnings to fall roughly 25% even though the “business” environment hasn’t changed at all.

Yet another aspect of financial management relating to the low rate environment engendered by QE is the option many companies have followed to borrow at low interest rates for the purpose of buying back stock.  Remember, there are two ways to grow EPS, grow the earnings or shrink the number of shares.  Buoyed by QE, companies have opted to buy back shares, allowing EPS to grow faster than earnings overall (in some instances, outright earnings declines have been “converted” into EPS gains through a shrinkage of the share base). 

For the market as a whole (the S&P 500 index), In each of the past five years, operating income per share, has grown faster than overall operating income – evidence of a share base shrinkage (A positive numbers in the chart below indicate share buy backs.  A negative number, share issuance).  As rates rise, this practice of borrowing to repurchase shares will diminish and the ability to manufacture EPS growth will be further challenged.
















Prima facie evidence that such financial machinations are still alive and well, surfaced earlier this week when Carl Icahn tweeted about acquiring a large stake in Apple Computer.  Icahn stated that Apple didn’t even need to grow its business for its share price to climb from $525 to $625 per share - they could simply borrow money at 3% and buyback shares that were more dear.  So whilst this financial maneuver is still viable, investors will be pressed to continue it should the cost of borrowing climb. 

In simple terms, any rise in interest rates will bring an end to the ability companies have had to manage the financial component of their businesses, even as the economy improves and helps their operating business.

There is one final element to managing the “financial” component of earnings that has nothing to do with interest rates.  It has to do with taxes.   As tax rates have come down over the years and as US companies do more business in lower tax jurisdictions, the effective taxes they have paid have fallen.  In other words, they get to keep more of the money they earned – another boost to the “non-business” side of earnings. 
Looked at from an economy-wide perspective (using the National Income and Product Account data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis), the effective tax rate paid by US companies has fallen dramatically, especially in the past decade.  For the most recent 12 months, companies have paid out a little more than 18% of their earnings as taxes.  That’s down from a 50-year average of roughly 34% - a reduction of almost 50%.  To put this into some perspective.  If today’s effective tax rate of 18% were to return to the 25% rate which was the norm as recently as 2002 – 2006, the net margin would decline from 8.1% to 7.4% – corresponding to an earnings decline of just over 8.5%.
















Unlike interest expense and share buybacks, I don’t necessarily think this is a trend that is going to reverse soon, but by the same token, I don’t see much room for improvement, especially as debt-laden Governments, worldwide, look to increase their revenue base.

So Linus and equity bulls, whilst I admire your faith and convictions, evidence would seem to be against the arrival of The Great Rotation.