Showing posts with label Asset Allocation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Asset Allocation. Show all posts

Monday, August 4, 2014

It's All in the Math - Fixed Income Returns for the Decade Ahead (1 of 2)

It is becoming a more common belief that equity and bond market returns are likely to be lower than normal in the years ahead.  If proven out, this will have negative implications for the many retirement plans that have target return assumptions based off of historical norms.  Shortfalls in returns will require additional contributions - either out of corporate profits (for private plans), or out of the pockets of taxpayers (for public plans).  Expected blended return expectations remain above 7.5% for most plans.  Returns from traditional fixed income and equity markets will not reach this level and a rethinking of expectations and asset allocations will be necessary. 

Using models I originally developed in the late 1990’s, we can arrive at accurate return projections for both fixed income and global equity market over the coming decade. 

Starting with fixed income markets.  A bond is a fairly straight forward instrument with returns accruing to just four factors: the price paid, the coupon payments received, the reinvestment of those coupons and the ultimate return of principal.  Taking each in turn, we know the price paid.  We also know the coupon payments as they are contractual in nature.  The reinvestment return of these coupons is unknown; however, as I will demonstrate, even an immediate, radical move in interest rates will not dramatically change the overall return of a bond over its lifetime.  Finally, while return of principal to a single bond may be uncertain, when looking at the broader market of bonds of similar ratings, historical experience can provide a reasonable guide as to default and recovery rates.  Putting these together, estimating long-term bond returns is a very straight forward process.

 
AN EXAMPLE 
 
At July 30th, you could buy a ten-year US government note with a maturity of May 15, 2024 for a price of $99.49.  That note will pay a semi-annual coupon at an annual rate of 2.50%.  At maturity, an investor will receive $100 and along the way, twice yearly coupon payments of $1.25 (per $100 value).  While we do not know the rate at which those coupons will be reinvested, even if we assume rates rise by 500 basis points before the first coupon payment is received (to 7.56% across all maturities), the total annualized return from this note will rise only to 2.85% over the ten year period.  Conversely, if rates fell to zero and an investor received no return at all on the coupons, the ten year total annualized return on this note falls only to 2.29%.  Thus, assuming no default, one can not expect anything other than a return of between 2.29% and 2.85% from buying a ten-year US government note today.  Another way of looking at this is, assuming no risk of default, the best approximation of the long-term return on a bond is probably just its current yield (on the UST, currently 2.56%).  Of course, the road to that compounded annual return need not be smooth.  Outsized returns or losses in a near-year, will cause out-year returns in the other direction as the result is mathematically determined.

 
DEVELOPED MARKET SOVEREIGN DEBT
 
Looking at other developed government bond markets (G-7 plus Australia and Spain), we note 10-year yields between 0.53% (Japan) and 3.43% (Australia).  Assuming no risk of default, these again are the best estimate for annualized local currency returns over the coming decade. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg

Of course, given the recent experience of certain governments (Argentina, Greece), zero chance of default might not be the best assumption.  If one wanted to insure themselves against default risk, we can look to the Credit Default Swap market to gauge the costs of protection.  Higher yielding markets such as Spain and Italy currently have annual “insurance” costs of 1.15% and 1.56%, respectively.  Perceived “safe” markets like the US and Germany have lower insurance costs of 0.25% and 0.42%, respectively.  Calculating the “net” return with insurance, we see a lower expectation for ten-year returns of between 2.87% (Australia) at the high end and -0.26% (Japan) at the low end.  Needless to say, developed market sovereign returns of 1% - 3% are not going to get plans to their return targets.












 
 
 

Source: Bloomberg

 
INVESTMENT GRADE, HIGH YIELD AND EMERGING MARKETS
 
Of course, government markets are not the only fixed income game in town.  Lower rated corporate credits, mortgage securities and the like broaden an investor’s opportunity set and we have seen dramatic evidence of plans reaching for yield over the past couple of years.  Still, like the sovereign bond markets, the current yield on these instruments, less an assumed default and recovery rate, makes for the best long-term expectations of their likely returns. 

While there are many segments within the broader fixed income universe, for the purposes of this posting, I have chosen to project returns for US High Yield, European High Yield, Emerging Market USD/EUR-Pay Sovereign and US Investment Grade segments – all fairly liquid markets.  Current Yields and Spreads (versus governments) are shown below.


US High Yield
Euro High Yield
EM Sovereign
US Inv Grade
Current Spread
3.75
4.49
5.05
1.45
Historic Spread (Median)
5.34
5.89
4.78
1.97
Current YTM
5.90
4.49
6.84
4.65
Source: BofA Merrill Lynch, Brett Gallagher Calculations

Once again, assuming no default, Current Yield to Maturity is our best guess at the long-term return from the various fixed income segments (between 4.5% and 7.0% in this example).  However, as there is some realistic level of default expected in each of these riskier pools, building a sensitivity analysis around the historic default level and recovery rates makes sense (detailed in the tables below). 

For reasonable default and recovery assumptions, I turned to data gathered by Moody’s Investors Service which has compiled cumulative 10-year default percentages across a number of markets and ratings classes for the 10-year periods ending 1970 - 2013 and also used their observed historical recovery percentages. 

I have converted the cumulative default figures into annual ones (shown in parenthesis below).  For the sensitivity analysis, I use the Worst, 25th Percentile, Median, 75th Percentile and Best Case historical experiences - though I would expect the 25th to 75th percentile range to capture the most likely outcomes.  Because of the longer history of the US data, I use that experience for other speculative markets as well (note: using a common data set with an inception date of 1983, European High Yield and EM Sovereign Debt actually have lower default rates than the US Universe over the common period – thus my assumptions may be slightly conservative).  For recovery rates, the sovereign experience has been better than corporates by about 10 percentage points and is also reflected in the sensitivities.

10-Year Cumulative (Annual Equivalent) Default Rates (1970 - 2013)

Investment Grade
US HY, Euro HY, EM Sovereign
Worst Case
10.33% (0.97%)
45.88% (3.85%)
25th Percentile
5.91% (0.58%)
38.93% (3.34%)
Median
4.89% (0.48%)
32.33% (2.84%)
75th Percentile
3.63% (0.36%)
18.80% (1.74%)
Best Case
1.26% (0.13%)
0.37% (0.04%)
Source: Moody’s, Brett Gallagher


Using a plausible range of default and recovery assumptions, we are now able to construct a narrow range of likely outcomes for nearly any fixed income segment we desire.  While the returns due to risk assets appear relatively attractive when compared with developed sovereign markets, the range of returns are far below historic experience and most investors assumed return assumptions. 


US High Yield Debt – Yield to Maturity 5.90%, Median 10-year Cumulative Default 32.3%

Annualized Default Rates
Recovery Rate 4.31% 0.04% 1.74% 2.84% 3.34% 3.85%
30.0% 5.76% 4.74% 4.12% 3.84% 3.57%
35.0% 5.76% 4.80% 4.22% 3.96% 3.70%
37.5% 5.76% 4.83% 4.27% 4.02% 3.77%
40.0% 5.76% 4.86% 4.31% 4.08% 3.84%
42.5% 5.76% 4.89% 4.36% 4.13% 3.90%
45.0% 5.76% 4.92% 4.41% 4.19% 3.97%
50.0% 5.76% 4.98% 4.51% 4.31% 4.10%
 

European High Yield Debt – Current Yield 4.49%, Median 10-year Cumulative Default 32.3%
           
Annualized Default Rates
Recovery Rate 2.93% 0.04% 1.74% 2.84% 3.34% 3.85%
30.0% 4.42% 3.36% 2.72% 2.44% 2.15%
35.0% 4.42% 3.43% 2.83% 2.56% 2.30%
37.5% 4.42% 3.46% 2.88% 2.63% 2.37%
40.0% 4.42% 3.49% 2.93% 2.69% 2.44%
42.5% 4.42% 3.53% 2.99% 2.75% 2.52%
45.0% 4.42% 3.56% 3.04% 2.81% 2.59%
50.0% 4.42% 3.62% 3.14% 2.93% 2.73%


US Investment Grade (Baa) – Current Yield 4.65%, Median 10-year Cumulative Default 4.89%
                       
Annualized Default Rates
Recovery Rate 3.09% 0.04% 0.19% 0.23% 0.34% 0.52%
30.0% 4.57% 4.47% 4.45% 4.38% 4.27%
35.0% 4.57% 4.48% 4.46% 4.39% 4.29%
37.5% 4.57% 4.49% 4.46% 4.40% 4.30%
40.0% 4.57% 4.49% 4.47% 4.40% 4.31%
42.5% 4.57% 4.49% 4.47% 4.41% 4.31%
45.0% 4.57% 4.50% 4.47% 4.42% 4.32%
50.0% 4.58% 4.50% 4.48% 4.43% 4.34%


 EM Sovereign (USD/EUR Pay) – Current Yield 6.84%, Median 10-year Cumulative Default 32.3%
                          
Annualized Default Rates
Recovery Rate 5.21% 0.04% 1.74% 2.84% 3.34% 3.85%
40.0% 6.64% 5.75% 5.21% 4.98% 4.74%
45.0% 6.64% 5.81% 5.31% 5.09% 4.87%
47.5% 6.64% 5.84% 5.35% 5.14% 4.93%
50.0% 6.64% 5.87% 5.40% 5.20% 5.00%
52.5% 6.64% 5.89% 5.45% 5.25% 5.06%
55.0% 6.64% 5.92% 5.49% 5.31% 5.12%
60.0% 6.64% 5.98% 5.59% 5.42% 5.25%
 
 
In my next post, I turn to global equity markets.

Wednesday, July 30, 2014

The Task of Capital Allocators

I had mentioned previously that I have been furiously at work on a new venture and that I would shortly have some news to report.  Today, I'd like to let you know what I have been up to.

For the past six months, I have been consulting with the Nile Capital Group, a private equity firm based in Los Angeles that provides capital and expertise to small and emerging asset managers.  As part of my work with them, I engaged in a study with a former colleague, Pranay Gupta, most recently the Chief Investment Officer for Lombard Odier in Hong Kong.

Pranay and I analyzed literally millions upon millions pieces of data (manipulating more than 20 million data points in all), examining monthly returns and the growth in Assets under Management (AUM) for over 50,000 US mutual funds - current and closed.  Portions of the full study can be obtained by interested consultants and institutional plan sponsors by contacting Nile directly. 

For my blog readers, I can share with you some of our findings.  Certain of these findings support prior research, while others are quite new - and I think illuminating.

1. Larger funds are benchmark huggers.  This is certainly not news to most investors, and whether the result is due to structural reasons (the strategies are too big and their trades influence the markets) or business ones ("we've succeed, so now let's not get fired") is of little consequence.  Statistically, you are likely to earn near-benchmark returns if you invest with a larger manager.

2. Small funds are the best performers.  However, I must offer a caveat - they are also the worst.  Thus, if you don't have the resources for, or skill in, manager selection, you need to hire someone to do it for you or should otherwise index.

3. There is a relationship between performance and a manager's ability to grow assets.  This conclusion may seem obvious, but there is more to it than most know.  Interestingly, the best performers are not the fastest growers - and the fastest growers are not the best performers.  Factors beyond performance strongly influence a manager's business success.  Also, it should be noted that once performance falls below the median, there is little distinction in asset gathering ability between funds.

  • The fastest growing decile of managers have a performance rank somewhere in the middle of the second quartile.  In other words, you don't have to be great to grow.  Good is good enough.

  • The best performing managers fall near the top of the second quartile in asset gathering abilityAgain, there is more to growth success than performance.  It is also true that performance has become a less important, though still positive, driver of asset growth since 2006.

4. As noted previously, the top asset gatherers (on average) are mid-second quartile performers.  However, over the three years following their success, they become, in aggregate, only slightly better than a median performer.


Connecting the Dots

If you want better than index performance, you need to find the right small manager in each asset class you are considering.  Assuming you select the right manager, this manager's success will result in a growth in their AUM and a diminuation of your alpha over time.  You will then have to go through the selection process again.  In the meantime, the manager has created a highly-valued annuity business.

The work of the plan sponsor includes helping their plans achieve a certain assumed rate of return through asset allocation and manager selection.  Depending upon the plan's return assumption and the returns actually realized, the employer may have to increase the annual amount contributed on behalf of employees should returns fall short. 

Today, most US defined benefit pension plans are underfunded and will either need to achieve better returns, or increase their funding amounts.  With taxpayers already strapped, the pursuit of higher returns matters more than ever.  Unfortunately, and as I will show in my annual long-term asset class return forecasts next month, almost all plans will fail to meet their assumed rate of returns in the coming decade (the National Association of State Retirement Administrators has reported that the average assumed rate of return for State plans is currently 7.72% - US Corporate assumptions are close, albeit slightly lower).

Thus, it becomes ever more important to find new asset vehicles to help achieve these goals.  One area plan sponsors should consider is not only investing with the best small managers, but also investing in the best small managers.

Also, in the interests of full disclosure, since May 1, 2014 I have been employed by Nile Capital Group and may continue in a similar role in the future.  This blog post is not a solicitation on behalf of any product, current or future, that may be offered by them.  The purpose of this blog is solely to convey the findings of the Gallagher/Gupta study and to suggest a potential course of exploration for plan sponsors, whether pursued on their own or through any other party.